Abstract: The lack of flexibility in public procurement design and implementation reflects public agents' political risk adaptation to limit hazards from opportunistic third parties --- political opponents, competitors, interest groups --- while externalizing the associated adaptation costs to the public at large. Reduced flexibility limits the likelihood of opportunistic challenge lowering third parties' expected gains and increasing litigation costs. We provide a comprehensible theoretical framework with empirically testable predictions.
Bio: Marian Moszoro earned his PhD in Economics in 2004 from the Warsaw School of Economics (SGH). In 2005-2006, he was appointed Undersecretary of State and Deputy Minister of Finance of Poland, the youngest ever in the history of the Ministry. In 2009-2011, he was a visiting scholar at Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley. His areas of current research are project finance, public-private hybrids, business & public policy, and risk allocation in infrastructure development.