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Robert Gibbons
MIT and NBER
http://web.mit.edu/rgibbons/www/
Lectures on :
Organizational Economics:
Past, Present, and Future?
Université de Paris X, 29 & 31 March 2005
Tuesday 29 March:
- Lecture 1 - 10h00-12h00
- Lecture 1A: Organizational Economics – An Emerging Field? - Salle de conférence du Bâtiment K
- Lecture 1B: Decision-Making in Organizations - Salle de conférence du Bâtiment K
Gibbons, Robert. 2000. “Why Organizations are Such a Mess (And What An Economist Might Do About It).” Unpublished manuscript.
Arrow, Kenneth. 1974. The Limits of Organization. New York: W.W. Norton.
Gibbons, Robert. 2003. “Team Theory, Garbage Cans, and Real Organizations: Some History and Prospects of Economic Research on Decision-Making in Organizations.” Industrial and Corporate Change 12: 753-87.
Sah, Raj, and Joseph Stiglitz. 1986. “The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies.” American Economic Review 76:716-27.
Feldman, Martha and James March. 1981. “Information in Organizations as Signal and Symbol.” Administrative Science Quarterly 26:171-86.
Authority and Power
Aghion, Philippe and Jean Tirole. 1997. “Formal and Real Authority in Organizations.” Journal of Political Economy 105:1-29.
Baker, George, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy. 1999. “Informal Authority in Organizations.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15: 56-73.
Rotemberg, Julio. 1993. “Power in Profit-Maximizing Organizations.” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 2:165-98.
Politics and Influence
March, James. 1962. “The Business Firm as a Political Coalition.” Journal of Politics 24:662-78.
Skaperdas, Stergios. 1992. “Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights.” American Economic Review 82: 720-39.
Rajan, Raghuram and Luigi Zingales. 2000. “The Tyranny of Inequality.” Journal of Public Economics 76: 521-58.
Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts. 1988. “An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in Organizations.” American Journal of Sociology 94:S154-S179.
Social Relations
Tirole, Jean. 1986. “Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 2:181-214.
Ichino, Andrea, and Giovanni Maggi. 2000. “Work Environment and Individual Background: Explaining Regional Shirking Differentials in a Large Italian Firm.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 115: 1057-90.
Fehr, Ernst, and Simon Gächter. 2000. “Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14: 159-81.
- Lecture 2 - 14h30-16h30
- Lecture 2A: Decision-Making in Organizations (continued) -
- Lecture 2B: Theories of the Firm - Salle de conférence du Bâtiment K
Culture
Kreps, David. 1990. “Corporate Culture and Economic Theory.” In J. Alt and K. Shepsle, eds. Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Cambridge University Press.
Cremer, Jacques, Luis Garicano, Andrea Prat. 2003. “Codes in Organizations.” Unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago.
Van den Steen, Eric. 2004. “On the Origin of Shared Beliefs (and Corporate Culture).” Unpublished manuscript, MIT.
Leadership
Hermalin, Benjamin. 1998. “Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading By Example.” American Economic Review 88: 1188-1206.
Weber, R. Rottenstreich, Y., Camerer, C. and Knez, M. 2001. “The Illusion of Leadership” Misattribution of Cause in Coordination Games.” Organizational Science 12:582-98.
Bertrand, Marianne and Antoinette Schoar. 2002. “Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118: 1169-1208.
Gibbons, Robert. 2004. “Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm.” Forthcoming, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.
Classic Contributions
Williamson, Oliver. 1971. “The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations.” American Economic Review 63: 316-25.
Alchian, Armen and Harold Demsetz. 1972. “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization.” American Economic Review 62: 777-95.
Klein, Benjamin, Robert Crawford, and Armen Alchian. 1978. “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process.” Journal of Law and Economics XXI: 297-326.
Williamson, Oliver. 1979. “Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations.” Journal of Law and Economics 22: 233-61.
Recent Advances
Holmstrom, Bengt. 1999. “The Firm as a Subeconomy.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 15: 74-102.
Grossman, S. and O. Hart (1986), "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration." Journal of Political Economy 94(4): 691-719.
Whinston, Michael. 2003. “On the Transaction Cost Determinants of Vertical Integration.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 19: 1-23.
Relational Theories
Klein, Benjamin and Kevin M. Murphy. 1997. “Vertical Integration as a Self-Enforcing Contractual Arrangement.” American Economic Review 87: 415-20.
Klein, Benjamin. 2000. “The Role of Incomplete Contracts in Self-Enforcing Relationships.” Revue D’Économie Industrielle 92: 67-80.
Baker, George, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy. 2002. “Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117: 39-83.
Thursday 31 March:
- Lecture 3 - 10h00-12h00 - Careers in Organizations - Salle G 614, 6° Et. Bâtiment G
- Lecture 4 - 14h30-16h30 : Forum Seminar : George P. Baker, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy. 2004., Strategic Alliances: Bridges Between "Islands of Conscious Power", Unpublished manuscript.
Gibbons, Robert, and Michael Waldman. 1999. “Careers in Organizations: Theory and Evidence.” Chapter 36 in Volume 3B of O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, North Holland.
Pay for Performance
Lazear, Edward. 2000. “Performance Pay and Productivity.” American Economic Review 90: 1346-61.
Oyer, Paul. 1998. "Fiscal Year Ends and Nonlinear Incentive Contracts: The Effect on Business Seasonality." Quarterly Journal of Economics 113:149-85.
Chevalier, Judith, and Glen Ellison. 1997. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives." Journal of Political Economy 105:1167-1200
Job Assignments
Waldman, Michael. 1984. “Job Assignment, Signaling, and Efficiency.” RAND Journal of Economics 15:255-87.
Brüderl, Josef, Andreas Diekmann, and Peter Preisendörfer. 1991. “Patterns of Intraorganizational Mobility: Tournament Models, Path Dependency, and Early Promotion Effects.” Social Science Research 20:197-216.
Chiappori, Pierre-André, Bernard Salanié, and Julie Valentin. 1999. “Early Starters versus Late Beginners.” Journal of Political Economy 107: 731-60.
Skill Development
Prendergast, Canice. 1993. “The Role of Promotion in Inducing Specific Human Capital Acquisition.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 108:523-34.
Acemoglu, Daron, and J. Stephen Pischke. 1998. “Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 113:79-119.
Autor, David. 2001. “Why Do Temporary Help Firms Provide Free General Skills Training?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116: 1409-48.
Integrative Models of Wages and Mobility
Baker, George, Michael Gibbs, and Bengt Holmstrom. 1994. “The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109:881-919.
Baker, George, Michael Gibbs, and Bengt Holmstrom. 1994. “The Wage Policy of a Firm.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109:921-55.
Gibbons, Robert, and Michael Waldman. 1999. “A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside a Firm.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114: 1321-58.
Employment Systems
Ichniowski, Casey, Kathryn Shaw, and Giovanna Prennushi. 1997. “The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines.” American Economic Review 87:291-313.
Baron, James, and Michael Hannan. 2002. “Organizational Blueprints for Success in High-Tech Start-Ups: Lessons from the Stanford Project on Emerging Companies.” California Management Review 44: 8-36.
Moriguchi, Chiaki. 2003. “Implicit Contracts, the Great Depression, and Institutional Change: A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and Japanese Employment Relations, 1920- 1940.”Journal of Economic History 63: 625-65.